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Gutmann and Thompson 96 – Amy Gutmann 96 is the president of Penn and former prof @ Princeton, AND Dennis Thompson is Alfred North Whitehead Professor of Political Philosophy at Harvard University, Democracy and Disagreement, pp 1

OF THE CHALLENGES that American democracy faces today, none is more formidable than the problem of moral disagreement. Neither the theory nor the practice of democratic politics has so far found an adequate way to cope with conflicts about fundamental values. We address the challenge of moral disagreement here by developing a conception of democracy that secures a central place for moral discussion in political life. Along with a growing number of other political theorists, we call this conception deliberative democracy. The core idea is simple: when citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions. But the meaning and implications of the idea are complex. Although the idea has a long history, it is still in search of a theory. We do not claim that this book provides a comprehensive theory of deliberative democracy, but we do hope that it contributes toward its future development by showing the kind of delib-eration that is possible and desirable in the face of moral disagreement in democracies. Some scholars have criticized liberal political theory for neglecting moral deliberation. Others have analyzed the philosophical foundations of deliberative democracy, and still others have begun to explore institutional reforms that would promote deliberation. Yet nearly all of them stop at the point where deliberation itself begins. None has systematically examined the substance of deliberation—the theoretical principles that should guide moral argument and their implications for actual moral disagreements about public policy. That is our subject, and it takes us into the everyday forums of democratic politics, where moral argument regularly appears but where theoretical analysis too rarely goes. Deliberative democracy involves reasoning about politics, and nothing has been more controversial in political philosophy than the nature of reason in politics. We do not believe that these controversies have to be settled before deliberative principles can guide the practice of democracy. Since on occasion citizens and their representatives already engage in the kind of reasoning that those principles recommend, deliberative democracy simply asks that they do so more consistently and comprehensively. The best way to prove the value of this kind of reasoning is to show its role in arguments about specific principles and policies, and its contribu¬tion to actual political debates. That is also ultimately the best justification for our conception of deliberative democracy itself. But to forestall pos¬sible misunderstandings of our conception of deliberative democracy, we offer some preliminary remarks about the scope and method of this book. The aim of the moral reasoning that our deliberative democracy pre-scribes falls between impartiality, which requires something like altruism, and prudence, which demands no more than enlightened self-interest. Its first principle is reciprocity, the subject of Chapter 2, but no less essential are the other principles developed in later chapters. When citizens reason reciprocally, they seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake; they try to find mutually acceptable ways of resolving moral disagreements. The precise content of reciprocity is difficult to determine in theory, but its general countenance is familiar enough in practice. It can be seen in the difference between acting in one's self-interest (say, taking advantage of a legal loophole or a lucky break) and acting fairly (following rules in the spirit that one expects others to adopt). In many of the controversies dis-cussed later in the book, the possibility of any morally acceptable resolution depends on citizens' reasoning beyond their narrow self-interest and considering what can be justified to people who reasonably disagree with them. Even though the quality of deliberation and the conditions under which it is conducted are far from ideal in the controversies we consider, the fact that in each case some citizens and some officials make arguments consistent with reciprocity suggests that a deliberative perspective is not Utopian. To clarify what reciprocity might demand under non-ideal conditions, we develop a distinction between deliberative and nondeliberative disa-greement. Citizens who reason reciprocally can recognize that a position is worthy of moral respect even when they think it morally wrong. They can believe that a moderate pro-life position on abortion, for example, is morally respectable even though they think it morally mistaken. (The abortion example—to which we often return in the book—is meant to be illustrative. For readers who deny that there is any room for deliberative disagreement on abortion, other political controversies can make the same point.) The presence of deliberative disagreement has important implications for how citizens treat one another and for what policies they should adopt. When a disagreement is not deliberative (for example, about a policy to legalize discrimination against blacks and women), citizens do not have any obligations of mutual respect toward their opponents. In deliberative disagreement (for example, about legalizing abortion), citizens should try to accommodate the moral convictions of their opponents to the greatest extent possible, without compromising their own moral convictions. We call this kind of accommodation an economy of moral disagreement, and believe that, though neglected in theory and practice, it is essential to a morally robust democratic life. Although both of us have devoted some of our professional life to urging these ideas on public officials and our fellow citizens in forums of practical politics, this book is primarily the product of scholarly rather than political deliberation. Insofar as it reaches beyond the academic community, it is addressed to citizens and officials in their more reflective frame of mind. Given its academic origins, some readers may be inclined to complain that only professors could be so unrealistic as to believe that moral reasoning can help solve political problems. But such a complaint would misrepresent our aims. To begin with, we do not think that academic discussion (whether in scholarly journals or college classrooms) is a model for moral deliberation in politics. Academic discussion need not aim at justifying a practical decision, as deliberation must. Partly for this reason, academic discussion is likely to be insensitive to the contexts of ordinary politics: the pressures of power, the problems of inequality, the demands of diversity, the exigencies of persuasion. Some critics of deliberative democracy show a similar insensitivity when they judge actual political deliberations by the standards of ideal philosophical reflection. Actual deliberation is inevitably defective, but so is philosophical reflection practiced in politics. The appropriate comparison is between the ideals of democratic deliberation and philosophical reflection, or between the application of each in the non-ideal circumstances of politics. We do not assume that politics should be a realm where the logical syllogism rules. Nor do we expect even the more appropriate standard of mutual respect always to prevail in politics. A deliberative perspective sometimes justifies bargaining, negotiation, force, and even violence. It is partly because moral argument has so much unrealized potential in dem-ocratic politics that we believe it deserves more attention. Because its place in politics is so precarious, the need to find it a more secure home and to nourish its development is all the more pressing. Yet because it is also already part of our common experience, we have reason to hope that it can survive and even prosper if philosophers along with citizens and public officials better appreciate its value in politics. Some readers may still wonder why deliberation should have such a prominent place in democracy. Surely, they may say, citizens should care more about the justice of public policies than the process by which they are adopted, at least so long as the process is basically fair and at least minimally democratic. One of our main aims in this book is to cast doubt on the dichotomy between policies and process that this concern assumes. Having good reason as individuals to believe that a policy is just does not mean that collectively as citizens we have sufficient justification to legislate on the basis of those reasons. The moral authority of collective judgments about policy depends in part on the moral quality of the process by which citizens collectively reach those judgments. Deliberation is the most appropriate way for citizens collectively to resolve their moral disagreements not only about policies but also about the process by which policies should be adopted. Deliberation is not only a means to an end, but also a means for deciding what means are morally required to pursue our common ends.

#### Effective deliberation is crucial to personal agency

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Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism

Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Continued… Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking. Arendt's Polemical Agonism As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy. Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point: You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42) Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03). In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes. This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate. Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263). Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242). Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324). Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism. Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action. In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

#### Democratic agonism can only successfully operate in a limited forum---it’s not a limitation on the content of argument, but on the form in which it is presented---this is not an appeal to exclusion, but to maximizing the deliberative potential of debate

Robert W. Glover 10 Prof of Poli Sci @ UConn "Games without Frontiers?: Democratic Engagement, Agonistic Pluralism, and the Question of Exclusion" Philosophy and Social Criticism Vol. 36

Recent democratic theory has devoted significant attention to the question of how to revitalize citizen engagement and reshape citizen involvement within the process of collective political decision-making and self-government. Yet these theorists do so with the sober recognition that more robust democratic engagement may provide new means for domination, exploitation- intensification of disagreement, or even the introduction of fanaticism into our public debates.1 Thus, numerous proposals have attempted to define the acceptable boundaries of our day-to-day democratic discourse and establish regulative ideals whereby we restrict the types of justifications that can be employed in democratic argumentation. This subtle form of exclusion delineates which forms of democratic discourse are deemed to be legitimate—worthy of consideration in the larger democratic community, and morally justifiable as a basis for policy. As an outgrowth of these concerns, this newfound emphasis on political legitimacy has provoked a flurry of scholarly analysis and debate." Different theorists promote divergent conceptions of what ought to count as acceptable and legitimate forms of democratic engagement, and promote more or less stringent normative conceptions of the grounds for exclusion and de-legitimization. One of the most novel approaches to this question is offered by agonistic pluralism, a strain of democratic theory advanced by political theorists such as William Connolly, Bonnie Honig, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and James Tully. Agonistic pluralism, or simply agonism, is a theory of democracy rooted in the ancient Greek notion of the agon, a public struggle or contest between adversaries. While recognizing the necessity of placing restrictions upon democratic discourse, agonistic pluralists also call upon us to guard against the naturalization of such exclusion and the coercive act of power which it implies. Rather, we must treat these actions as contingent, subject to further scrutiny, critique, and re-articulation in contentious and widely inclusive democratic spaces. In so doing, agonistic pluralism offers us a novel means of approaching democratic discourse, receptive to the claims of new actors and identities while also recognizing that there must be some, albeit minimal, restrictions placed on the form that such democratic engagement takes. In short, the goal of agonists is not to 'eradicate the use of power in social relations but to acknowledge its ineradicable nature and attempt to modify power in ways that are compatible with democratic values'.5 This is democracy absent the 'final guarantee\* or the 'definitive legitimation.'4 As one recent commentator succinctly put it, agonistic pluralism forces democratic actors to '...relinquish all claims to finality, to happy endings../.5 Yet while agonistic pluralism offers valuable insights regarding how we might reshape and revitalize the character of our democratic communities, it is a much more diverse intellectual project than is commonly acknowledged. There are no doubt continuities among these thinkers, yet those engaged in agonistic pluralism ultimately operate with divergent fundamental assumptions, see different processes at work in contemporary democratic politics, and aspire towards unique political end-goals. To the extent that we do not recognize these different variants, we risk failing to adequately consider proposals which could positively alter the character of our democratic engagement, enabling us to reframe contemporary pluralism as a positive avenue for social change and inclusion rather than a crisis to be contained. This piece begins by outlining agonistic pluralism's place within the larger theoretical project of revitalizing democratic practice, centered on the theme of what constitutes 'legitimate" democratic discourse. Specifically, I focus on agonism's place in relation to 'participatory' and 'deliberative' strains of democratic theory. I then highlight the under-examined diversity of those theorists commonly captured under the heading of agonistic pluralism, drawing upon Chantal Mouffe\*s recent distinction between 'dissociative' and 'associative' agonism. However, I depart from her assertion that 'associative agonists' such as Bonnie Honig and William Connolly offer us no means by which to engage in the 'negative determination of frontiers\* of our political spaces. Contra Mouffe, I defend these theorists as offering the most valuable formulation of agonism, due to their articulation of the civic virtues and democratic (re)education needed to foster greater inclusivity and openness, while retaining the recognition that democratic discourse must operate with limits and frontiers.

#### Agreement is a precondition for contestation

Ruth Lessl Shively 2K, associate professor of political science at Texas A&M, 2000 Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 181-2

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to—they must reject and limit—some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest—that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect—if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony. The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must be shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need of the subversive for an order to subvert. But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox should tell us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and some ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest. It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implications, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic, but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion.Yet difficulties remain. For agreement is not simply the initial condition, but the continuing ground, for contest. If we are to successfully communicate our disagreements, we cannot simply agree on basic terms and then proceed to debate without attention to further agreements. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements. Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At the very least, the two discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested, and so on. They must also agree—and they do so simply by entering into debate—that they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.

#### Effective deliberative discourse is the lynchpin to solving all existential problems---switch-side debate is most effective---our K turns the whole case

Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

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#### We advocate the entirety of the 1AC san the aesthetics portion.

#### Historical examples prove: aesthetics enable the eradication of difference and expansion of empire. The appeal to the circle is a particularly insidious tool of global capitalism.

**Castronovo 03** [Russ, “Geo-Aesthetics: Fascism, Globalism, and Frank Norris” boundary 2, Fall 2003]

Early-twentieth-century histories of Manifest Destiny shoulder much of the burden in allowing aesthetic formalism to go global. As William Griffis asserted in his 1899 The Romance of Conquest, ‘‘The United States of America have become, in the full sense of the word, a World Power, and in a double sense, ‘the great Pacific Power.’ ’’7 Aesthetics run deeper than formatting historiography in the fictive mode of ‘‘romance’’ and ‘‘story,’’ however. What makes American incursions in the Pacific so peaceful is an overall harmony of empire that resolves contradiction by treating differences as isolated, particularistic content that achieves greater unity at the structural remove of form. International tension, even hemispheric conflict, seems mere content that can be bracketed off in the realization of a larger isomorphism of form: ‘‘The Far East has become the Near West.’’8 A generation earlier, in Hunt’s Merchant Magazine of 1845, this formula of complete and total identity had been expressed as a purely geometric precept: ‘‘For three centuries, the civilized world has been rolling westward; and Americans of the present age will complete the circle.’’9 As ideal form, the circle provides a figure for the imagination both to comprehend the world as a globe and to manage international commerce as globalization.

#### Despite the near-intuitive appeal of the synthesis between politics and art, such a pairing collapses into itself and creates the spectacle needed to achieve imperialist fascism.

**Castronovo 03** [Russ, “Geo-Aesthetics: Fascism, Globalism, and Frank Norris” boundary 2, Fall 2003]

The problem with this political task is that progressive commentary often envisions democracy in anti-aesthetic terms. ‘‘With socialism there will be no need for art because the people will become their own art,’’ runs an apothegm that Anthony Easthope attributes to Raymond Williams.17 Within this counteraesthetic orientation, the demos no longer need choose between the seductive pleasures of artistic representation and the tedium of political representation: the polis is unified as an objet d’art. Once the tendrils of art are cut back, politics presumably will have no need for mediation and will represent the popular directly and immanently. A similar counteraesthetic appeal braces The Octopus in its story of a young poet turned young socialist who denounces the triumph of organized capital by scorning art. Among the first literary treatments of socialism in the United States—still new enough to be used only in adjectival form and capitalized as ‘‘Socialistic’’— the novel suggests ‘‘the people’’ will be rejuvenated by twin attacks on corporate greed and genteel humanism. This counteraesthetic impetus correlates exactly with the young poet’s design to politicize the literary in ways that will advance democracy. But as The Octopus collapses aesthetics and politics, it jumbles fascism and democracy. Norris provides avant la lettre a theoretical sequel to Benjamin’s account of the forces of authoritarianism, spectacle, and reproduction that propel the populace toward fascism. These forces are global in nature: The Octopus locates aesthetics/politics at the site of transnational markets, and it is this totalizing geography that unifies fascist representation and democratic desire. Fueled by this counteraesthetic impetus, the political novel represents democracy in ways that seem a lot like fascism. Richard Chase first remarked on the eerie intimacy between Norris ‘‘the ardent democrat’’ and Norris ‘‘the protofascist.’’18 Norris falls short of full-blown fascism because his demagogues are not in bed with any official bureaucratic apparatus. Rather, they remain hopelessly devoted to the people and their art; the poet in The Octopus, for instance, seeks no State or elite organs to transmit his Homeric ode of the West. He instead participates in a world poetics of commerce, sailing off to India to fold East into West. It is precisely where the State drops out of the picture that the global enters in the form of the AngloSaxon ‘‘race’’ expanding across the Pacific. The protofascist is more properly a post fascist who retools the aesthetic politics of unity to a global world where state channels are outmoded by the new connections of world culture. Norris’s vision of a universal ‘‘white city’’ that emerges well in advance of any help from the State has a strange currency in our global era when, as many would have it, the State has become increasingly less relevant.19 For the postfascist committed to democratic forms, political aesthetics and aesthetic politics converge in images of the people as a once disorganized mass that acquires unity under the spectacle of world markets backed up by imperialist aggression

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#### A 1AC without value is meaningless – presume neg until they present a value system that doesn’t collapse upon itself

Henning 9 – associate professor of philosophy at Gonzaga University (Brian, ‘Trusting in the Efficacy of Beauty: A Kalocentric Approach to Moral Philosophy’, Ethics and the Environment)

Final truths (whether in religion, morality, or science) are unattainable not only due to the finitude and fallibility of human inquirers, but because we live in what the theologian John F. Haught calls an "unfinished universe" (2004). The notion that one could achieve anything like a final or absolute formulation in any field of study presupposes that one's object is static. Thankfully, we do not live in such a universe. Over the last century scientists have consistently discovered that the universe is not a plenum of lifeless, valueless facts mechanistically determined by absolute laws. Rather, we live in a processive cosmos that is a dynamic field of events organized in complex webs of interdependence, rather than a collection of objects interacting via physical laws. The intuition that the universe is fundamentally a clockwork machine successfully guided science in the wake of Newton's inspirational formulation of the laws of mechanics, but this metaphor proved increasingly inadequate as Newton's work was supplanted in the early 20th century by both general relativity and quantum mechanics. Even at its peak, the [End Page 107] mechanical metaphor created difficulties for thinking about human beings, who were never effectively illuminated by the assumption that they were complex machines. At the level of elementary particles, quantum mechanics disclosed a world of wave-like particles spread out in space and inextricably entangled with other particles in the local environment. The notion of autonomous "individual" particles disappeared. Although all metaphors are misleading to some degree, the metaphor of the world as an evolving organism has become more helpful than the old mechanical model of the world as a clock. This, in a sense, is the founding insight of Whitehead's "philosophy of organism," which took as its starting point the view that individuals—particles, plants, and people—are not discrete facts walled off from each other but parts of complex and intersecting wholes. Conceived of as an organic process, every individual is inextricably intertwined and interconnected with every other. The fundamental reality is no longer individual entities but rather the ongoing processes by which they interact and create novel structures. Once we recognize that every individual—from a subatomic event to a majestic sequoia—brings together the diverse elements in its world in just this way, just here, and just now, we see that nothing is entirely devoid of value and beauty. This process whereby many diverse individuals are brought together into the unity of one new individual, which will eventually add its energy to future individuals, characterizes the most basic feature of reality and is what Whitehead calls the "category of creativity." On this view, reality is best characterized not as an unending march of vacuous facts, but as an incessant "creative advance" striving toward ever-richer forms of beauty and value. Noting its emphasis on interdependence and interrelation, many scholars have rightly noted that Whitehead's metaphysics is uniquely suited to provide a basis for making sense of our relationship to the natural world.10 Decades before modern ecologists taught us about ecosystems, Whitehead was describing individuals as interrelated societies of societies. No individual, Whitehead insisted, can be understood apart from its relationship to others.11 Indeed, whereas ecologists only explain how it is that macroscopic individuals are related in interdependent systems, Whitehead's organic metaphysics of process provides a rich account of how individuals at every level of complexity—from subatomic events to ecosystems, and from oak trees to galaxies—arise and are perpetuated.12 [End Page 108] What is more, Whitehead's philosophy of organism places a premium on an individual's dependence on and relationship to the larger wholes of which it is a part without making the mistake of subsuming the individual into that larger whole.13 With the philosophy of organism we need not choose between either the one or the many, "the many become one and are increased by one" (Whitehead [1929] 1978, 21). By providing a robust alternative to the various forms of reductive physicalism and destructive dualism that currently dominate many branches of science and philosophy, the philosophy of organism is an ideal position from which to address the complex social and ecological challenges confronting us. First, if who and what I am is intimately and inextricably linked to everyone and everything else in the universe, then I begin to recognize that my own flourishing and the flourishing of others are not independent. Not only do I intimately and unavoidably depend on others in order to sustain myself, with varying degrees of relevance, how I relate to my environment is constitutive of who and what I am. As we are quickly learning, we ignore our interdependence with our wider environment at our own peril. Moreover, in helping us to recognizing our connection to and dependence on our larger environment, an organic model forces us to abandon the various dualisms that have for too long allowed us to maintain the illusion that we are set off from the rest of nature. Adopting an organic metaphysics of process forces us finally to step down from the self-constructed pedestal from which we have for millennia surveyed nature and finally to embrace the lesson so compellingly demonstrated by Darwin: humans are not a singular exception to, but rather a grand exemplification of, the processes at work in the universe.14 In this way we ought finally to reject not only the materialisms of contemporary science, but also the dualisms that often undergird our religious, social, political, and moral understandings of ourselves and our relationship to the natural world. As John Dewey concisely put it, "man is within nature, not a little god outside" (1929, 351). Until we shed our self-deluding arrogance and recognize that who and what we are as a species is fundamentally bound up in and dependent on the wider scope of events unfolding in the universe, the ecological crisis will only deepen. Taken seriously, our understanding of reality as composed of vibrant, organically interconnected achievements of beauty and value, has a dramatic effect on how we conceive [End Page 109] of ourselves, of nature, and of our moral obligations—morality can no longer be limited merely to inter-human relations. In rejecting modernity's notion of lifeless matter, we come to recognize that every form of actuality has value in and for itself, for others, and for the whole. In aiming at and achieving an end for itself, every individual—no matter how ephemeral or seemingly insignificant—has intrinsic value for itself and in achieving this self-value it thereby becomes a value for others and for the whole of reality.

#### History lesson – death and other forms of exclusion are a product of anthropocentric subjugation and are patterned on speciesist assumptions.

Best 7 (Dr. Steven, Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy, University of Texas, El Paso. Reviewing: Charles Patterson, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust New York: Lantern Books, 2002, 280 pp., Journal of Critical Animal Studies, Vol. 5, Issue 2, we don’t endorse trivialization of the Holocaust)

The Origins of Hierarchy "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals. Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for all other systems of domination such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples. “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as“rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom.” For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanityand social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Chistianithy left behind. By the nineteenth century, exploiting a corrupt understanding of Darwin’s natural selection theory, Social Darwinists promoted the pernicious ideology of “Might is Right” in order to frame class domination as something natural and inevitable rather than contingent and subject to change. A variant of Social Darwinism was used by Hitler and German Nazis to justify their genocidal campaigns’. Ultimately derived from speciesism, the Might is Right view continues to prop up human barbarity toward animals, and it has sedimented into a bland, unreflective “common sense” consent to human supremacism and the ongoing pogrom against animals.

#### The alternative is to reject the aff to embrace inevitable extinction through the global suicide of humanity as a thought experiment – that allows us to break free of human-centered ethics

Kochi and Ordan 8 (Tarik, lecturer in the School of Law, Queen's University, Belfast, Northern Ireland, and Noam, linguist and translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, Israel, 'An argument for the global suicide of humanity', *Borderlands*, December)

The version of progress enunciated in Hawking's story of cosmic colonisation presents a view whereby the solution to the negative consequences of technological action is to create new forms of technology, new forms of action. New action and innovation solve the dilemmas and consequences of previous action. Indeed, the very act of moving away, or rather evacuating, an ecologically devastated Earth is an example at hand. Such an approach involves a moment of reflection--previous errors and consequences are examined and taken into account and efforts are made to make things better. The idea of a better future informs reflection, technological innovation and action. However, is the form of reflection offered by Hawking broad or critical enough? Does his mode of reflection pay enough attention to the irredeemable moments of destruction, harm, pain and suffering inflicted historically by human action upon the non-human world? There are, after all, a variety of negative consequences of human action, moments of destruction, moments of suffering, which may not be redeemable or ever made better. Conversely there are a number of conceptions of the good in which humans do not take centre stage at the expense of others. What we try to do in this paper is to draw out some of the consequences of reflecting more broadly upon the negative costs of human activity in the context of environmental catastrophe. This involves re-thinking a general idea of progress through the historical and conceptual lenses of speciesism, colonialism, survival and complicity. Our proposed conclusion is that the only appropriate moral response to a history of human destructive action is to give up our claims to biological supremacy and to sacrifice our form of life so as to give an eternal gift to others. From the outset it is important to make clear that the argument for the global suicide of humanity is presented as a thought experiment. The purpose of such a proposal in response to Hawking is to help show how a certain conception of modernity, of which his approach is representative, is problematic. Taking seriously the idea of global suicide is one way of throwing into question an ideology or dominant discourse of modernist-humanist action. [3] By imagining an alternative to the existing state of affairs, absurd as it may seem to some readers by its nihilistic and radical 'solution', we wish to open up a ground for a critical discussion of modernity and its negative impacts on both human and non-human animals, as well as on the environment. [4] In this respect, by giving voice to the idea of a human-free world, we attempt to draw attention to some of the asymmetries of environmental reality and to give cause to question why attempts to build bridges from the human to the non-human have, so far, been unavailing. Subjects of ethical discourse One dominant presumption that underlies many modern scientific and political attitudes towards technology and creative human action is that of 'speciesism', which can itself be called a 'human-centric' view or attitude. The term 'speciesism', coined by psychologist Richard D. Ryder and later elaborated into a comprehensive ethics by Peter Singer (1975), refers to the attitude by which humans value their species above both non-human animals and plant life. Quite typically humans conceive non-human animals and plant life as something which might simply be used for their benefit. Indeed, this conception can be traced back to, among others, Augustine (1998, p.33). While many modern, 'enlightened' humans generally abhor racism, believe in the equality of all humans, condemn slavery and find cannibalism and human sacrifice repugnant, many still think and act in ways that are profoundly 'speciesist'. Most individuals may not even be conscious that they hold such an attitude, or many would simply assume that their attitude falls within the 'natural order of things'. Such an attitude thus resides deeply within modern human ethical customs and rationales and plays a profound role in the way in which humans interact with their environment. The possibility of the destruction of our habitable environment on earth through global warming and Hawking's suggestion that we respond by colonising other planets forces us to ask a serious question about how we value human life in relation to our environment. The use of the term 'colonisation' is significant here as it draws to mind the recent history of the colonisation of much of the globe by white, European peoples. Such actions were often justified by valuing European civilisation higher than civilisations of non-white peoples, especially that of indigenous peoples. For scholars such as Edward Said (1978), however, the practice of colonialism is intimately bound up with racism. That is, colonisation is often justified, legitimated and driven by a view in which the right to possess territory and govern human life is grounded upon an assumption of racial superiority. If we were to colonise other planets, what form of 'racism' would underlie our actions? What higher value would we place upon human life, upon the human race, at the expense of other forms of life which would justify our taking over a new habitat and altering it to suit our prosperity and desired living conditions? Generally, the animal rights movement responds to the ongoing colonisation of animal habitats by humans by asking whether the modern Western subject should indeed be the central focus of its ethical discourse. In saying 'x harms y', animal rights philosophers wish to incorporate in 'y' non-human animals. That is, they enlarge the group of subjects to which ethical relations apply. In this sense such thinking does not greatly depart from any school of modern ethics, but simply extends ethical duties and obligations to non-human animals. In eco-ethics, on the other hand, the role of the subject and its relation to ethics is treated a little differently. The less radical environmentalists talk about future human generations so, according to this approach, 'y' includes a projection into the future to encompass the welfare of hitherto non-existent beings. Such an approach is prevalent in the Green Party in Germany, whose slogan is "Now. For tomorrow". For others, such as the 'deep ecology' movement, the subject is expanded so that it may include the environment as a whole. In this instance, according to Naess, 'life' is not to be understood in "a biologically narrow sense". Rather he argues that the term 'life' should be used in a comprehensive non-technical way such that it refers also to things biologists may classify as non-living. This would include rivers, landscapes, cultures, and ecosystems, all understood as "the living earth" (Naess, 1989, p.29). From this perspective the statement 'x harms y' renders 'y' somewhat vague. What occurs is not so much a conflict over the degree of ethical commitment, between "shallow" and "deep ecology" or between "light" and "dark greens" per se, but rather a broader re-drawing of the content of the subject of Western philosophical discourse and its re-definition as 'life'. Such a position involves differing metaphysical commitments to the notions of being, intelligence and moral activity. This blurring and re-defining of the subject of moral discourse can be found in other ecocentric writings (e.g. Lovelock, 1979; Eckersley, 1992) and in other philosophical approaches. [5] In part our approach bears some similarity with these 'holistic' approaches in that we share dissatisfaction with the modern, Western view of the 'subject' as purely human-centric. Further, we share some of their criticism of bourgeois green lifestyles. However, our approach is to stay partly within the position of the modern, Western human-centric view of the subject and to question what happens to it in the field of moral action when environmental catastrophe demands the radical extension of ethical obligations to non-human beings. That is, if we stick with the modern humanist subject of moral action, and follow seriously the extension of ethical obligations to non-human beings, then we would suggest that what we find is that the utopian demand of modern humanism turns over into a utopian anti-humanism, with suicide as its outcome. One way of attempting to re-think the modern subject is thus to throw the issue of suicide right in at the beginning and acknowledge its position in modern ethical thought. This would be to recognise that the question of suicide resides at the center of moral thought, already. What survives when humans no longer exist? There continues to be a debate over the extent to which humans have caused environmental problems such as global warming (as opposed to natural, cyclical theories of the earth's temperature change) and over whether phenomena such as global warming can be halted or reversed. Our position is that regardless of where one stands within these debates it is clear that humans have inflicted degrees of harm upon non-human animals and the natural environment. And from this point we suggest that it is the operation of speciesism as colonialism which must be addressed. One approach is of course to adopt the approach taken by Singer and many within the animal rights movement and remove our species, homo sapiens, from the centre of all moral discourse. Such an approach would thereby take into account not only human life, but also the lives of other species, to the extent that the living environment as a whole can come to be considered the proper subject of morality. We would suggest, however, that this philosophical approach can be taken a number of steps further. If the standpoint that we have a moral responsibility towards the environment in which all sentient creatures live is to be taken seriously, then we perhaps have reason to question whether there remains any strong ethical grounds to justify the further existence of humanity. For example, if one considers the modern scientific practice of experimenting on animals, both the notions of progress and speciesism are implicitly drawn upon within the moral reasoning of scientists in their justification of committing violence against nonhuman animals. The typical line of thinking here is that because animals are valued less than humans they can be sacrificed for the purpose of expanding scientific knowledge focussed upon improving human life. Certainly some within the scientific community, such as physiologist Colin Blakemore, contest aspects of this claim and argue that experimentation on animals is beneficial to both human and nonhuman animals (e.g. Grasson, 2000, p.30). Such claims are 'disingenuous', however, in that they hide the relative distinctions of value that underlie a moral justification for sacrifice within the practice of experimentation (cf. LaFollette & Shanks, 1997, p.255). If there is a benefit to non-human animals this is only incidental, what remains central is a practice of sacrificing the lives of other species for the benefit of humans. Rather than reject this common reasoning of modern science we argue that it should be reconsidered upon the basis of species equality. That is, modern science needs to ask the question of: 'Who' is the best candidate for 'sacrifice' for the good of the environment and all species concerned? The moral response to the violence, suffering and damage humans have inflicted upon this earth and its inhabitants might then be to argue for the sacrifice of the human species. The moral act would be the global suicide of humanity.

### Case

#### The aff’s method prioritizes observations without pragmatic strategy ---- continues to re-entrench the squo

Bryant 12 (Levi, Critique of the Academic Left, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)

I must be in a mood today– half irritated, half amused –because I find myself ranting. Of course, that’s not entirely unusual. So this afternoon I came across a post by a friend quoting something discussing the environmental movement that pushed all the right button. As the post read,¶ For mainstream environmentalism– conservationism, green consumerism, and resource management –humans are conceptually separated out of nature and mythically placed in privileged positions of authority and control over ecological communities and their nonhuman constituents. What emerges is the fiction of a marketplace of ‘raw materials’ and ‘resources’ through which human-centered wants, constructed as needs, might be satisfied. The mainstream narratives are replete with such metaphors [carbon trading!]. Natural complexity,, mutuality, and diversity are rendered virtually meaningless given discursive parameters that reduce nature to discrete units of exchange measuring extractive capacities. Jeff Shantz, “Green Syndicalism”¶ While finding elements this description perplexing– I can’t say that I see many environmentalists treating nature and culture as distinct or suggesting that we’re sovereigns of nature –I do agree that we conceive much of our relationship to the natural world in economic terms (not a surprise that capitalism is today a universal). This, however, is not what bothers me about this passage.¶ What I wonder is just what we’re supposed to do even if all of this is true? What, given existing conditions, are we to do if all of this is right? At least green consumerism, conservation, resource management, and things like carbon trading are engaging in activities that are making real differences. From this passage– and maybe the entire text would disabuse me of this conclusion –it sounds like we are to reject all of these interventions because they remain tied to a capitalist model of production that the author (and myself) find abhorrent. The idea seems to be that if we endorse these things we are tainting our hands and would therefore do well to reject them altogether.¶ The problem as I see it is that this is the worst sort of abstraction (in the Marxist sense) and wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶ Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park:

The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶

Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Profit!¶ They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶

Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows:

¶ Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!¶

Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing?¶ But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done!¶ But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.¶ What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation.¶ “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.

## 2NC

#### Debate is never the site for social change only for learning the skills to advocate for change

Atchison and Panetta 9 – \*Director of Debate at Trinity University and \*\*Director of Debate at the University of Georgia (Jarrod, and Edward, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,” The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed., 2009, p. 317-334)

The final problem with an individual debate round focus is the role of competition. Creating community change through individual debate rounds sacrifices the “community” portion of the change. Many teams that promote activist strategies in debates profess that they are more interested in creating change than winning debates. What is clear, however, is that the vast majority of teams that are not promoting community change are very interested in winning debates. The tension that is generated from the clash of these opposing forces is tremendous. Unfortunately, this is rarely a productive tension. Forcing teams to consider their purpose in debating, their style in debates, and their approach to evidence are all critical aspects of being participants in the community. However, the dismissal of the proposed resolution that the debaters have spent countless hours preparing for, in the name of a community problem that the debaters often have little control over, does little to engender coalitions of the willing. Should a debate team lose because their director or coach has been ineffective at recruiting minority participants? Should a debate team lose because their coach or director holds political positions that are in opposition to the activist program? Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change. The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community. If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed. From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

#### Democratic deliberation key to effective political engagement

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I have argued, therefore, that ideas from pragmatism and from the study of complex dynamic systems provide us with a sound basis for a ‘neo-modernist’ affirmation of the role of intelligence in policy making. Faced with an increasing appreciation of the complexity of social problems through work in non-linear dynamics, we need to reconcile the pressure for radical and innovative policy solutions to such problems with the entreaty to be cautious and modest in our expectations of policy action. This implies the adoption of a ‘trial-and-error’ approach involving experimentation and learning, an approach that is consistent with the pragmatist emphasis on testing our ‘policy hypotheses’ through our efforts to change and improve social conditions. Moreover, I argue that we must maintain our faith in the endeavour of social science as the route to a better understanding of the social world and therefore seek to harness the best available social scientific evidence into the policy-making process, but nevertheless acknowledge its contingent and fallible nature, its ‘contestability’ in the context of making decisions about future policy action, and therefore the importance of testing it out in the experience of policy making and implementation. We must recognise the validity of other forms of intelligence, notably the practice wisdom of practitioners and the experiential wisdom embedded in informed public opinion and seek to bring these to bear upon policy making alongside the social scientific evidence, in a deliberative process. Finally, we must recognise that policy making is not just a technical exercise of harnessing evidence and expertise but a broader exercise in ‘practical rationality’, a communicative or deliberative process within which ethical and moral concerns are addressed and all legitimate voices can be heard in coming to ‘reasonable decisions’ (Toulmin, 2001). And as a practical, deliberative process, it is an arena of potential learning, a potential which, however, is not capable of full realisation within the confines of technical rationality. In the light of our analysis of the implications of complexity and pragmatism, it is this theme of learning that emerges as the key for the future development of policy making, as recognised by Majone (1989, p. 183), who argues that: learning is the dominant form in which rationality exhibits itself in situations of great cognitive complexity. This suggests that the rationality of public policy-making depends more on improving the learning capacity of the various organs of public deliberation than on maximising achievement of particular goals. The themes of policy making as an exercise in practical rationality, as a deliberative process and as a learning process take us a long way from the territory of technical, instrumental rationality within which so much discussion of evidence-based policy making is situated. Acknowledging the challenges posed by recognition of the increasing complexity of social and economic problems and of the dynamic processes behind them and accepting (as I suggest we do) the implications of pragmatism as a foundation for a normative model of policy making, we might reasonably adopt the Deweyan notion of ‘intelligent policy making’ to encapsulate what we should be striving for. At the heart of intelligent policy making should be the commitment to experimentation and learning. We should ensure that all relevant ‘intelligence’ is brought into the processes of deliberation – intelligence comprising our best available social scientific evidence, the practice wisdom of those who are experienced in dealing with social problems ‘on the ground’ and the ‘common sense’ of those who experience such problems. We should treat our policies as ‘hypotheses’ designed to provide appropriate solutions to complex social problems but around which there are greater or lesser degrees of uncertainty. Therefore, they need to be tested out in experience, with the nature of the test reflecting the degree of uncertainty. Where there is greater uncertainty, we should introduce pilots or trials, evaluate their success and move forward cautiously. Where there is less uncertainty we can be more decisive in implementation but rigorous monitoring and evaluation should be undertaken to test the validity of the assumptions upon which the policy is based and to capture learning to feed into future policy deliberations. As Jowell (2003, p. 34) argues, this will require a culture change in policy making, but there are some positive signs, as in the increased use of pilots discussed above. In a broad sense devolution in the UK has to some degree released the potential for ‘differentiated policy making’ and policy innovation and attention is focusing on policy divergence in Scotland and Wales (Adams and Schmuecker, 2005). The recent advent of the Scottish Nationalist administration in Scotland may strengthen this trend. A potentially positive sign is provided by the recent report of the Ministerial Task Force on Health Inequalities (Scottish Government, 2008) which recommended a strengthening of the role of evaluation in policy learning and the piloting of ‘learning networks’ in a number of sites to encourage experimentation with new approaches. This report therefore provides some important signals towards the development of a learning approach to policy making in Scotland. The importance of building our capacity for policy learning has been emphasised by Graham Leicester (2006), who advocates ‘reflection in action’ as a learning model for professionals and practitioners, ‘drawing on reserves of experience, intuition, tacit knowledge and all the hidden skills and capacities that technical rationality has relegated to obscurity’ (Leicester, 2006, p. 12). There is a need, he argues, to make space for more creative thinking, ‘small-scale experimentation’ and action learning projects, and for encouraging, supporting and legitimising the role of ‘boundary spanners’– people who can take the initiative to cross organisational, practice and knowledge boundaries, to join up and encourage learning (Leicester, 2006, pp. 14–7). The Scottish health ‘learning networks’ referred to above can be seen as consistent with this position, providing sites for ‘action learning’, drawing both on robust evaluation and evidence of ‘what works’ and on the wealth of experience and tacit knowledge of local practitioners in building knowledge to guide appropriate intervention. The emphasis on ‘boundary spanning’ and sharing knowledge and practice indicates the importance of the principles of openness and ‘connectivity’– the need to maximise the number of channels and links for communication and dialogue and to encourage ‘conversation’ on both an intra- and inter-organisational basis. As Leicester (2006, p. 8) argues, ‘all learning starts with conversation’. This brings us back to Majone's deliberative, communicative conception of policy making; and for Dewey, the ideal model for the resolution of social problems was free and open communication, a position subsequently developed also by Jürgen Habermas (Rosenthal, 2002). This raises a wider issue for a government seeking to promote ‘intelligent policy making’ viz. its role in creating the wider social and institutional conditions to support this model of policy learning. For Dewey the answer lay in fostering the development of a truly democratic society, ‘the generation of democratic communities and an articulate democratic public’ (Dewey, 1954, p. 217) informed through the free and open dissemination and communication of the results of social inquiry. Dewey was committed to democracy not just as the political and institutional context for an open, pluralistic, participatory model of policy making but more, according to Sandra Rosenthal (2002, p. 218), as ‘the political expression of the functioning of the experimental method’. It provides the conditions for the application of intelligence through experimental inquiry to facilitate negotiation, adjustment, accommodation and compromise required to produce the ‘balance of interests’ in intelligent decision making. For Dewey, the democratic process is ‘inherently experimental, cooperative, transformative’; a process through which individuals and communities grow by learning (Rosenthal, 2002, p. 220). In this sense, the development of a model of policy learning in government needs to be set in the context of moves to promote a learning society founded upon a stronger institutional basis for free and open communication of knowledge and for discussion and debate. The final word should be given to Dewey (1954, p. 208, emphasis in original): The essential need ... is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. That is the problem of the public. We have asserted that this improvement depends essentially upon freeing and perfecting the processes of inquiry and of dissemination of their conclusions.

#### Solves ideology

Muir 93 – Star Muir, communication studies at George Mason University, 1993 (Philosophy and Rhetoric 26.4, p. 278)

The emphasis on method---focusing on the technique of debate as an educational end---is characteristic of the defense of debating both sides of a resolution. Interscholastic debate, many scholars reason, is different from “real world” disputation; it lacks the purposes or functions of a senate speech, a public demonstration, or a legal plea. Debate is designed to train students to construct arguments, to locate weaknesses in reasoning, to organize ideas, and to present and defend ideas effectively, not to convert the judge to a particular belief.

MARKED AT BELIEF

#### Academic debate regarding war powers makes checks on excessive presidential authority effective---college students key

Kelly Michael Young 13, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics at Wayne State University, "Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers", 9/4, public.cedadebate.org/node/13

Beyond its obviously timeliness, we believed debating about presidential war powers was important because of the stakes involved in the controversy. Since the Korean War, scholars and pundits have grown increasingly alarmed by the growing scope and techniques of presidential war making. In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution (WPR) to increase Congress’s role in foreign policy and war making by requiring executive consultation with Congress prior to the use of military force, reporting within 48 hours after the start of hostiles, and requiring the close of military operations after 60 days unless Congress has authorized the use of force. Although the WPR was a significant legislative feat, 30 years since its passage, presidents have frequently ignores the WPR requirements and the changing nature of conflict does not fit neatly into these regulations. After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, many experts worry that executive war powers have expanded far beyond healthy limits. Consequently, there is a fear that continued expansion of these powers will undermine the constitutional system of checks and balances that maintain the democratic foundation of this country and risk constant and unlimited military actions, particularly in what Stephen Griffin refers to as a “long war” period like the War on Terror (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058286). In comparison, pro-presidential powers advocates contend that new restrictions undermine flexibility and timely decision-making necessary to effectively counter contemporary national security risks. Thus, a debate about presidential wars powers is important to investigate a number of issues that have serious consequences on the status of democratic checks and national security of the United States.¶ Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.

## 1NR

**The denial of the objective suffering that capitalism naturalizes violence and makes us indifferent toward limitless annihilation**

**Zavarzadeh 94** (Mas'Ud, The Stupidity That Consumption Is Just as Productive as Production": In the Shopping Mall of the Post-al Left," College Literature, Vol. 21, No. 3, The Politics of Teaching Literature 2 (Oct., 1994),pp. 92-114)

What is **obscured** in this representation of the non-dialogical is, of course, the violence of the dialogical. I leave aside here the violence with which these advocates of non-violent conversations attack me in their texts and cartoon. My concern is with the practices by which the post-al left, through dialogue, **naturalizes** (and eroticizes) the violence that keeps capitalist democracy in power. What is violent? Subjecting people to the **daily terrorism** of layoffs in order to maintain high rates of profit for the owners of the means of production or redirecting this violence (which gives annual bonuses, in addition to multi-million-dollar salaries, benefits, and stock options, to the CEOs of the very corporations that are laying off thousands of workers) against the ruling class in order to end class societies? What is violent? Keeping millions of people in poverty, hunger, starvation, and homelessness, and deprived of basic health care, at a time when the forces of production have reached a level that can, in fact, provide for the needs of all people, or trying to overthrow this system? What is violent? Placing in office, under the alibi of "free elections," post fascists (Italy) and allies of the ruling class (Major, Clinton, Kohl, Yeltsin) or struggling to end this farce? What is violent? Reinforcing these practices by "talking" about them in a "reasonable" fashion (that is, within the rules of the game established by the ruling class for limited reform from "within") or marking the violence of conversation and its complicity with the status quo, there by breaking the frame that represents "dialogue" as participation, when in fact it is merely a formal strategy for legitimating the established order? Any society in which the labor of many is the source of wealth for the few-all class societies-is a **society of violence**, and no amount of "talking" is going to change that **objective fact.** "Dialogue" and "conversation" are aimed at arriving at a consensus by which this violence is made more **tolerable, justifiable, and naturalized.**

#### The 1ac’s search for meaning is never-ending – it stops us from confronting boredom

Svendsen 05 (Lars, Norwegian Professor of Philosophy, *A Philosophy of Boredom*, p. 30-1)

Human beings are addicted to meaning. We all have a great problem: Our lives must have some sort of content. We cannot bear to live our lives without some sort of content that we can see as constituting a meaning. Meaninglessness is boring. And boredom can be described metaphorically as a meaning withdrawal. Boredom can be understood as a discomfort which communicates that the need for meaning is not being satisfied. In order to remove this discomfort, we attack the symptoms rather than the disease itself, and search for all sorts of meaning-surrogates. A society that functions well promotes man's ability to find meaning in the world; one that functions badly does not. In premodern societies there is usually a collective meaning that is sufficient.67 For us 'Romantics', things are more problematic, for even though we often embrace collectivist modes of thought, such as nationalism, they always ultimately appear to be sadly insufficient. Of course, there is still meaning, but there seems to be less of it. Information, on the other hand, there is plenty of. Modern media have made an enormous search for knowledge possible - some­thing that undeniably has positive aspects, but by far the most of it is irrelevant noise. If, on the other hand, we choose to use the word 'meaning' in a broad sense, there is no lack of meaning in the world - there is a superabun­dance. We positively wade through meaning. But this meaning is not the meaning we are looking for. The empti­ness of time in boredom is not an emptiness of action, for there is always something in this time, even if it is only the sight of paint drying. The emptiness of time is an emptiness of meaning.

#### This search to avoid boredom makes the largest atrocities possible

Svendsen 05 (Lars, Norwegian Professor of Philosophy, *A Philosophy of Boredom*, p. 69-77)

Patrick Bateman, the main character in Bret Easton Ellis's American Psycho/8 is William Lovell 200 years on. Admittedly, William's list of sins is fairly modest compared to Bateman's run of sadistic murders,79 for William merely murders a couple of people, carries out some predatory raids, abducts a woman, commits fraud... The extreme scenes of murder and torture in American Psycho were necessary because the crimes carried out by William are fairly anodyne by today's standards. Even so, William and Patrick are spiritual brothers who share boredom and transgression as their main perspectives on the world. Whereas the word Langeweile can be found on virtually every page of William Lovell, the term 'bored' only appears about ten times in American Psycho. Bateman is sick with boredom and resorts to bestiality in the hope of being able to get beyond this boredom. The relationship between an aesthetic lifestyle, boredom, transgression and evil is clearly formulated in Stendhal's On Love: One sees the ageing Don Juan blame the state of things, never himself, for his own satiety. One sees him being tormented by the poison that consumes him, carry on in all directions and continually change the object of his desire. But no matter what charisma he has, it is ultimately a choice between two evils - between still and bustling boredom. This is the sole choice left to him. Finally, he realises the fatal truth and admits it to himself, after which the only pleasure he has left is imposing his will on others, of doing evil for the sake of evil.80 Don Juan cannot, according to his own logic, blame himself for the boredom into which he has plunged ever more deeply because he has not wished for this to happen.81 Patrick Bateman, too, claims that he is guiltless.82 The transgression is ultimately neither liberating nor self-realizing, and yet is seems to the Romantic to be the only alternative. Romanticism leads to existentialism, and the Romantic William Lovell claims 'My existence is the only conviction which is necessary for me.'83 Sartre could easily have written that in Being and Nothingness. Perhaps I can reformulate the thesis: Romanticism is already existentialism and existentialism is incorrigibly Romantic. Of course, all of this is intimately connected to historical and political developments. With the emergence of the bourgeoisie and the death of God, ~~man~~ no longer set outs to serve something or someone else, but seeks to fulfil ~~him~~self and gain ~~his~~ own happiness. The adventurousness of the Romantic is an aesthetic reaction to the monotony of the bourgeois world. The human subject is to be the source of all meaning and value, but it is still tied to the limitations of the physical world. The Romantic self attempts to overcome this situation by appropriating the entire world, i.e., by transgressing or negating all outer limits and rejecting all corrective standards outside himself. The romantic self becomes a solipsistic self, one that has no belief in anything outside itself - for there cannot be any meaning other than what it has produced itself. While Tieck seems to condone the acts of William Lovell - not in the sense of defending his misdeeds, but rather because, like Holderlin, he harbours a deep respect for Romantic striving - Bret Easton Ellis rejects every aspect of Patrick Bateman. William is not a traditional villain. He has an unquenchable thirst for freedom, for fully realizing himself. This calls for a transgression of limits that are both outer (e.g. laws and customs) and inner (e.g. shame and conscience). He is, perhaps, the first fictional hero who consistently follows a transgressive logic. More of them were to follow, with Patrick Bateman as the most extreme to date. The first words in American Psycho are 'abandon all hope ye who enter here/ We recognize this as the injunction above the gate to the Inferno in Canto 111 of Dante's Commedia. The final words of the novel are 'this is not an exit'.84 The story is framed by these two sentences; as Bateman correctly observes: 'My life is a living hell.' But nobody ever listens to him when he points this out. One of the novel's mottos - taken from the song (Nothing But) Flowers by Talking Heads - is 'And as things fell apart / Nobody paid much attention.' There is no wholeness of meaning in American Psycho; all the events are like isolated atoms. The novel has a completely flat and episodic structure, without any genuine progression and an end that just tails off. It consists of little other than the affluent Patrick Bateman's descriptions of fashion, tv shows, murder, torture, drinks, superficial dialogues, etc. It is universe with no genuine qualitative differences, a world of levelling. And levelling creates boredom. One of the few episodes that has the strongest emotional impact on Bateman in the course of the novel is when one of his acquaintances has a smarter visiting card than himself.85 Everybody in Bateman's world is the same. They are all rich and trim, with fine physiques.86 Since everything appears to be the same, any difference, no matter how insignificant it would appear to be for the reader, becomes crucial for Bateman; he is, for example, full to bursting-point at the difference between two brands of mineral water!87 The only thing that matters is the surface: 'I feel like shit but look great.'88 Bateman is repeatedly described by others as 'the boy next door',89 but he himself claims to be 'a fucking evil psychopath',90 although without anyone paying any attention. His lack of identity is emphasised throughout the novel by his being confused with other people. Not even the doorman in his building seems to recognize his existence: 'I am a ghost to this man, I'm thinking. I am something unreal, something not quite tangible.'91 And later in the novel, during dinner with a woman he later tortures and murders: CI mean, does anyone really see anyone? Does anyone really see anyone else? Did you ever see me7. SeeV 92 He has no sense of personal identity, and attempts to achieve an identity by means of fashion and transgressions. The exteriorization of his personality is also indicated by his talking about himself in one chapter in the third person.93 He compensates for a minimal self by consistently attempting to transgress, to expand. Bateman tries to establish a sense of identity by making subtle distinctions between different designer brands, but this is such an abstract, impersonal meaning that it cannot serve a genuinely individuating function. He therefore attempts to create an experience of a self by means of transgressions. A distinction between transgression and transcendence could be useful here. Transgression simply means exceeding or going beyond a limit. It can be moderate or radical, but it always takes place within the same plane. Hence we can say that a transgression is always horizontal or flat. Transcendence, on the other hand, implies more of a qualitative leap into something radically other. The closest Bateman ever comes to transcendence is when he has a quasi-religious experience at a U2 concert: Suddenly I get this tremendous surge of feeling, this rush of knowledge and my own heart beats faster because of this and it's not impossible to believe that an invisible chord attached to Bono has now encircled me and now the audience disappears and the music slows down, gets softer, and it's just Bono onstage - the stadium's deserted, the band fades away.94 It is worth noting that this near-transcendence comes about without Bateman actively attempting to promote it - it forces itself on him from the outside. He first dismisses Bono's outstretched hand, but he finds himself affected nevertheless. Bono represents grace - grace can perfectly well assume an apparently trivial form, as Flannery O'Connor so brilliantly describes it in novels and short stories - but Bateman fails to hold on to the moment. He does not gain redemption, like Faust for example, but falls back into world and feels that information about business transactions is more important than the bond with Bono. The moment does not last, for there is no room for the moment in Bateman's world, as his deep boredom stifles even mystical experiences, and he slides back into immanence. For Patrick, transgression not transcendence is what counts. The problem is that after a while transgression ceases to mean anything to him; the atrocious is no longer capable of creating any sort of feeling in him.95 Patrick is like all the others around him, except that he is more extreme, and he also seems to suffer more under the all-embracing shallowness. Let us take a closer look at a passage near the end of the novel, where Patrick formulates something which can be taken as his philosophical outlook on life: where there was nature and earth, life and water, I saw a desert landscape that was unending, resembling some sort of crater, so devoid of reason and light and spirit that the mind could not grasp it on any sort of conscious level and if you came close the mind would reel backward, unable to take it in. It was a vision so clear and real and vital to me that in its purity it was almost abstract. This was what I could understand, this was how I lived my life, what I constructed my movement around, how I dealt with the tangible. This was the geography around which my reality revolved: it did not occur to me, ever, that people were good or that a man was capable of change or that the world could be a better place through one's taking pleasure in a feeling or a look or a gesture, of receiving another person's love or kindness. Nothing was affirmative, the term 'generosity of spirit' applied to nothing, was a cliche, was some kind of bad joke. Sex is mathematics. Individuality no longer an issue. What does intelligence signify? Define reason. Desire - meaningless. Intellect is not a cure. Justice is dead. Fear, recrimination, innocence, sympathy, guilt, waste, failure, grief, were things, emotions, that no one felt anymore. Reflection is useless, the world is senseless. Evil is its only permanence. God is not alive. Love cannot be trusted. Surface, surface, surface was all that anyone found meaning in ... this was civilisation as I saw it, colossal and jagged .. .96 God is dead, the world is devoid of meaning, justice is dead and sexuality fully quantified, reduced to a question of how much and how many. This is Bateman's world. There is nothing but surface, and this surface has no depth at all. How could one possibly find meaning in such a world? His answer is to push it to its limits and beyond, to transgress every conceivable and inconceivable limit, in order to create differences and thereby transgress the levelling. By wading in gore and ripping out guts, Bateman feels he actually manages to get hold of something real. 'This is my reality. Everything outside of this is like some movie I once saw.'97 Reality slips away from him, and the reader is unable to determine with any certainty what Bateman really does and what he merely imagines, for there is no corrective standard outside his own, solipsistic reality: 'This is simply how the world, my world, moves.'98 Such a solipsism is fully in compliance with traditional existentialist thought, with the use of such terms as 'anxiety', 'dread', 'nausea', etc. Anxiety espe-daily plays a central role in American Psycho. Bateman mentions a 'nameless dread' on a number of occasions." He says 'something about various forms of dread' to his secretary, without specifying further.100 This dread has little metaphysical depth. On one occasion he has an attack of anxiety because there are too many films to choose from in a video shop. The banality of the anxiety, however, does not make it any the less serious for the person affected by it. Bateman's evil probably has its roots in this feeling of dread. In C. Fred Alford's insightful study, What Evil Means to Us, precisely the feeling of dread is emphasised as a common feature of evil.101 The world appears to be completely contingent for Bateman, and all his acts seem to be completely random. He repeatedly claims that there is no ultimate reason for doing one thing rather than another. Everything he has previously learnt - 'principles, distinctions, choices, morals, compromises, knowledge, unity, prayer - all of it was wrong, without any final purpose.'102 The politically correct pronouncements that Patrick reels off have no substance and no relation at all to the life he is actually living. As when he says that it is vital to promote a return to traditional values and social conscience, and to fight materialism.103 There are three chapters in the book on music, for music is one of Bateman's main interests: one on Genesis, one on Whitney Houston and one on Huey Lewis and the News. In other words, he has a terrible taste in music. These chapters are interesting because the appalling banalities Bateman reels off about this music are actually more profound and mature than he normally is himself. He is deeply moved by a song by Genesis that expresses 'loneliness, paranoia and alienation', but also a 'hopeful humanism'.104 Lacking an emotional life of his own, the banal music becomes a surrogate. For instance, he praises Huey Lewis and the News for singing so much about love instead of posing as young nihilists.105 He is deeply moved by Whitney Houston's The Greatest Love of All, which he claims approaches the sublime and expresses a crucial message to mankind: 'Its universal message crosses all boundaries and instils one with the hope that it's not too late for us to better ourselves, to act kinder. Since it is impossible in the world to empathize with others, we can always empathize with ourselves. It's an important message, crucial really.'106 This nonsense naturally has an ironic effect in the novel. Where Bateman attempts to show some real depth, his abnormal shallowness is revealed. It is also worth noting a song by Madonna, Like a Prayer, which Bateman hears several times: 'life is a mystery, everyone must stand alone.'107 Bateman is alone in the world, cut off from any human contact that goes beyond the uncompromisingly superficial, and his life is incomprehensibly flat. Bateman's existential exile and lack of a real world, make any empathic relation to other people impossible, but they also drain him of all humanity: I had all the characteristics of a human being - flesh, blood, skin, hair - but my depersonalization was so intense, had gone so deep, that the normal ability to feel compassion had been eradicated, the victim of a slow, purposeful erasure. I was simply imitating reality, a rough resemblance of a human being, with only a dim corner of my mind functioning. He writes about his own Virtual absence of humanity'.109 Bateman has in fact a certain degree of self-knowledge, and realizes that he has no substance, but argues that it has been impossible to reach any sort of deeper understanding of himself.110 The impossibility stems from the fact that there is no depth there to understand, other than a desperate sense of boredom. No rational analysis can tell him who is, for cthere ... is ... no ... key'. Hegel makes the point that as soon as a certain level of self-consciousness is reached, a need for an identity emerges. Such an identity can exist in many different variants; the important thing for the present concern is that the lack of such an identity is incompatible with leading a meaningful life. Bateman's perversities make up his absolutely hopeless attempt at overcoming boredom in a world that contains no personal meaning for him.

#### Capitalism thrives on the use of Aesthetic imagery- the use of aesthetic STIFLES discontent and allows capital to flow

Castronovo 03 [Russ, “Geo-Aesthetics: Fascism, Globalism, and Frank Norris” boundary 2, Fall 2003] The world circulation of commodities pivots on aesthetic criteria. Overproduction in the West finds its ‘‘natural’’ point of balance in Asian famine. Ruthless business tactics and military intervention in the Pacific are small and forgettable in comparison to the beautiful infinity of global exchange. Aesthetic perfection brackets any unharmonious or foreign matter in the novel’s final image of wheat pouring out of a grain chute into an ‘‘ever-reforming cone . . . the rushing of the Wheat that continued to plunge incessantly from the iron chute in a prolonged roar, persistent, steady, inevitable’’ (646). Whether it is the marines who opened China’s door or wheat growers hurt by international destabilizations of the 1890s, the never-ending formalism of the cone of wheat eliminates bodies of tension and conflict. Totalizing and complete, this cone is global in more ways than one: the cone of wheat rises in the hold of a ship bound for the East. Ceaseless form overrides less universal, less beautiful details, such as the asphyxiated body of S. Behrman, buried alive beneath the always perfect cone. Flowing over the suffocated corpse that figures as an anti-Semitic condensation of a worldwide economy, the wheat abides by criteria that privilege aesthetic form over the specific horror of political content suggested by the capitalist’s body. The materials of the economy—for Norris, grain is the fundamental stuff of transnational exchange—become a dynamic artwork, exemplifying how aestheticization ‘‘becomes the means through which the discontents in contemporary civilization are to be answered—or stifled.’’43 Nothing can stop the cone from returning to the form of a cone, just as nothing can prevent the Anglo Saxon form of civilization from advancing westward until arriving at the East, in effect, returning civilization to its birthplace. Like the cone of wheat that suffers neither break nor interruption, West flows into East without leaving so much as a trace of suture or conflict. Literary sensibility comprehends the globe as an ‘‘ever-reforming’’ geopolitical circle. ‘‘The space of imperial sovereignty,’’ write Hardt and Negri, ‘‘is smooth.’’ However seamless, the globe (or cone) as an aesthetic object is ‘‘crisscrossed by so many fault lines that it only appears as a continuous, uniform space.’’44 The form of the wheat, from the seed of resurrection to dynamic cone of world commodity, is whole and perfect in the end because each is a totalizing experience, condensing

East and West into the unitary kernel of one big market.

#### Capitalism organizes their aesthetic expression – they do not get to determine interpretation

**The Pinnochio Theory 2008**(<http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?cat=11>)

It is true that **the old** Taylorist, **hierarchical style** of business management **has largely been abandoned** – at least in the developed world. But the new management style that has replaced it, with its emphasis on local autonomy and responsibility, and on horizontal networks rather than vertical, hierarchical chains of command, is not in any sense more open and liberating. What the creativity of the multitude comes down to, in postmodern globalized capitalism, is this. **Today capitalism demands of its workers not just physical exertion, but mental exertion as well. In order to survive, we are forced to sell, not just our “labor power”** (as Marx called it**), but** also **our affective** and cognitive **powers, our abilities to think and feel and create, our aesthetic sensibility and our capacity for enjoyment. Capitalism does not just steal the fruits of these powers from us. It also organizes our very expression of these powers in the first place.**

#### The affirmative expands the market of capital investment -

The Pinnochio Theory 2008(<http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?cat=11>)

This is why, **in the world of aesthetic capitalism**, **we are free exclusively — and quite precisely — as consumers**. The conjunctive synthesis of consumption is the only one of the three syntheses in which we are able to make free, or formally unconstrained, choices. For as Kant tells us, “only the liking involved in taste for the beautiful is disinterested and free, since we are not compelled to give our approval by any interest, whether of sense or of reason.” The first (connective) synthesis, the production of production, is something like a physics, or a mechanics, of bodies and their energies. Roughly speaking, it corresponds to the phenomenal world of Kant’s First Critique, and to what Kant calls the “interests of sense.” For the world of production is driven by sheer material need: we are compelled to sell our labor-power, simply in order to survive. The second (disjunctive) synthesis, the production of recording, is something like an ethics, or a politics, of social organization and distribution. Roughly speaking, it corresponds to the noumenal, moral world of Kant’s Second Critique and to what Kant calls the “interests of reason.” The world of distribution and circulation is driven by the constraints of the market. These constraints appear to us as ineluctable laws in the face of which there is No Alternative — so that (as Kant says of the moral law) “we are objectively no longer free to select what we must do.” But the third (conjunctive) synthesis, **the production of consumption, stands apart from both of these sets of interests or compulsions. Therefore it corresponds,** roughly speaking, to Kant’s Third Critique, **with** its **aesthetics of sensibility and enjoyment. The world of consumption is the only one that “leaves us the freedom to make an object of pleasure for ourselves out of something or other**.”

**Capitalism Supports Biopower**

**HARDT & NEGRI** (Professors and good marxists) **2K**   
[Michael & Antonio. Empire, http://textz.gnutenberg.net/text.php?id=1034709069754 ]

The danger of the discourse of general intellect is that it risks remaining entirely on the plane of thought, as if the new powers of labor were only intellectual and not also corporeal (Section 3.4). As we saw earlier, new forces and new positions of affective labor characterize labor power as much as intellectual labor does. Biopower names these productive capacities of life that are equally intellectual and corporeal. The powers of production are in fact today entirely biopolitical: in other words, they run throughout and constitute directly not only production but also the entire realm of reproduction. Biopower becomes an agent of production when the entire context of reproduction is subsumed under capitalist rule, that is, when reproduction and the vital relationships that constitute it themselves become directly productive. Biopower is another name for the real subsumption of society under capital, and both are synonymous with the globalized productive order. Production ‘ fills the surfaces of empire: is a machine that is full of life, an intelligent life that by expressing itself in production and reproduction as well as in circulation (of labor, affects, and languages) stamps society with a new collective meaning and recognizes virtue and civilization in cooperation